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Since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, concepts such as civil society and public 
sphere have been frequently used both as analytical tools and as normative concepts deemed 
essential to a well-functioning liberal democracy. Because of its theoretical roots in Western 
liberal thinking, scholars in African studies such as the Comaroffs, Mamdani and Ekeh have 
vigorously debated the extent to which the concept of civil society is useful in explaining and 
interrogating developments in Africa. However, the concept of the public sphere has been 
subjected to less rigorous debate in the field of African studies. In media studies and political 
science, however, a number of scholars have problematised the normative connotations and 
idealistic assumptions of the Habermasian public sphere. This article argues that both the 
debate on civil society in African studies and the debate on public sphere in media studies 
and political science could inform a more critical discussion on the relevance of the concept 
of public sphere in African contexts Secondly, the article contends that the concept of popular 




The genealogy of the concepts of civil society and public sphere are inextricably linked. Both 
constitute fundamental building blocks of liberal-democratic political theory. While there has 
been a lively debate on the relevance of the concept of civil society in African studies, the 
concept of public sphere has been subject to less rigorous discussion and debate. It has often 
been deployed in a rather loose manner and has frequently been used interchangeably with 
the concept of civil society. This article starts by providing a brief outline of debates on civil 
society in African studies and critiques in media studies and political science of the 
Habermasian public sphere. It argues that both debates could inform a more rigorous 
discussion of the concept of the public sphere in African studies. Secondly, the article seeks 
to demonstrate the value of the concept of popular culture in contributing towards a fuller and 
richer understanding of public spheres in Africa. 
 
2. Civil society as policy recommendation 
The concept of civil society gained popularity in the early 1990s in the wake of the so-called 
‘third wave of democratisation’ which comprised a gradual disappearance of autocratic one-
party and military governments and the introduction of multi-party regimes in Eastern Europe 
and parts of Africa. The rising popularity of the concept of ‘civil society’ in both policy and 
academic accounts on Africa should be understood against the background of the end of the 
Cold War and the declining legitimacy of communism as ideology (Abrahamsen 2000). 
Whilst previously a strong state was considered to be crucial for economic growth, the 
Washington consensus that emerged in the 1980s prescribed a reduction of the state and an 
increasing role for civil society. Civil society then primarily emerged as policy prescription in 
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order to improve the performance of African states (Lewis 2001). While the state was 
perceived as bad, civil society was considered to be inherently good. 
 The concept of civil society features prominently in the discourse on ‘good 
governance’ which has been a major policy priority of Western donors. Donors have sought 
to promote more effective states through support of civil society organizations which are 
expected to watch over state performance. For example, in 2007, the British Department of 
International Development (DfID) launched a £100 million Governance and Transparency 
Fund which was designed to “help citizens hold their governments to account, through 
strengthening the wide range of groups that can empower and support them”.1  
 With concepts such as ‘civil society’, ‘democracy’ and ‘good governance’ at present 
dominating the development debate on Africa, it is easy to take these ideas for granted and to 
conclude that these have always been regarded as intrinsically good values. However, while 
at present there appears to be a consensus that liberal democracy is required for development, 
until the early 1990s, it was commonplace to argue that development could only be obtained 
in the absence of democratisation (Abrahamsen 2000). In order to accelerate economic 
growth, it was deemed necessary to temporarily suspend democratic freedoms. But with the 
growing hegemony of neoliberal ideas since the 1980s, liberalisation of the economy and a 
retreat of the state have been advocated as measures required in order to speed up economic 
growth. Until the post-Washington consensus of the mid-1990s, the state had been presented 
as inherently bad for development and an increased role for civil society organizations was 
often proposed as a solution that would improve state performance.  
 In the post-Cold War context, civil society thus increasingly began to emerge as 
programmatic ideal or policy prescription, not only in grey literature but also in academic 
analyses. It was seen as both a counterweight to a ‘bad state’ and a replacement for a 
‘reduced state’. For example, Harbeson (1994: 1-2, quoted in Lewis 2001: 5) argued that 
“civil society is a hitherto missing key to sustained political reform, legitimate states and 
governments, improved governance, viable state-society and state-economy relationships, 
and prevention of the kind of political decay that undermined new African governments a 
generation ago”. The emphasis here is on ‘missing key’ which suggests that Africa does not 
have a ‘civil society’, and that it therefore needs to be ‘established’. This is echoed in 
development policy reports such as for example the guidelines of DfID’s Civil Society 
Challenge Fund which state that “[m]ost Civil Society Challenge Fund projects involve a 
partnership based around the applicant helping to build the capacity of the southern partner to 
empower the poor”.2  
 The strengthening of civil society was conceptualised as a means towards poverty 
reduction and good governance. Civil society was considered as intrinsically ‘good’ and as a 
‘power-free’ zone which, nevertheless, has the capability to hold the state to account. 
However, this approach assumes that power is concentrated in the state and that by increasing 
the power of civil society, a more accountable government is created. This simplistic 
conceptualisation of power is very similar to what Foucault (1980: 122) summed up as to 
“cut off the King’s head”, i.e. the idea that just by cutting the King’s head off one is able to 
solve the problem of too much power vested in the state. However, this ignores the actual 
workings of power and the way in which power tends to be dissipated in networks of 
relations. Foucault objected to the idea of power as a system of total domination. He 
understood power not as emanating from a certain point but as dispersed through a network 
of relationships. Hence, civil society can then not be seen as a zone where there are no 
conflicts of interests. Like the state, civil society is subject to a range of contestations and 
                                                 
1 See: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/funding/gtf-guidelines07.asp (last accessed: 15 September 2008). 
2 See: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/funding/civilsocietyguidelines08.asp (last accessed: 15 September 2008). 
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power struggles. Because of this entanglement in relations of power, it cannot be assumed 
that a strengthening of civil society automatically will result in a more democratic state. 
While the state cannot be conceptualized as a priori bad, the aims and objectives of civil 
society should be evaluated critically in order to assess their potential contribution to a more 
benevolent state.  
 
3. The debate on civil society in African Studies 
The recurrent deployment of civil society as policy prescription for Africa in the 1990s in 
both policy and academic discourse provoked a response from scholars in African Studies. 
They argued that the prescription that Africa should ‘build’ its civil society assumed that 
Africa did not have a ‘civil society’. The dominant normative discourse profoundly masked 
the historical legacy of civil society organisations on the continent and also excluded African 
organisations which did not neatly fit with assumptions made about civil society because 
these organisations were not defined in opposition to the state but organized along the lines of 
kinship, ethnicity or local ‘tradition’. Mahmood Mamdani, for example, has criticised the 
practice of carrying out ‘history by analogy’, i.e. to assume that “civil society exists as a fully 
formed construct in Africa as in Europe, and that the driving force of democratisation 
everywhere is the contention between civil society and the state” (1996: 13). Mamdani is 
concerned about the way in which the concept of civil society has been deployed as 
normative concept, i.e. where it is expected to operate as a counterforce to the state.  
 Instead of using civil society as a programmatic and prescriptive tool, Mamdani 
proposes to instead deploy the concept as an analytical and historical tool. In this regard, he 
has advocated for “an analysis of actually existing civil society so as to understand it in its 
actual formation, rather than as a promised agenda for change” (1996: 19). In his book 
Citizen and subject, Mamdani (1996) describes what he calls the ‘bifurcated state’ in Africa 
which he considers to be a result of settler colonialism. Settler colonialism entailed the 
creation of a category of citizens who enjoyed full civil, political and economic rights, and 
the creation of a category of subjects who where denied these fundamental rights. Settlers 
were given citizen status and had access to the cities while natives were subjected to 
customary rule and were contained in rural ‘reserves’. Mamdani argues that civil society 
should be seen as primarily the creation of the colonial state. As Mamdani has pointed out, 
civil society was profoundly racialised and “[t]he rights of free association and free publicity, 
and eventually of political representation, were the rights of citizens under direct rule, not of 
subjects indirectly ruled by a customarily organised tribal authority” (1996: 19). This is what 
Mamdani calls the first historical moment in the development of civil society in Africa. The 
second moment is the moment of the anti-colonial struggle. Mamdani sees this period as 
profoundly a struggle of the ‘native’ strata, the subjects, to gain entry into civil society. That 
entry, that expansion of civil society was the result of an anti-state struggle, and the 
consequence was the creation of an indigenous civil society. Mamdani therefore does not 
consider the emergence of civil society in Africa as a recent phenomenon that took off in the 
1990s but treats anti-colonial liberation movements as perfect examples of African civil 
society organisations (which later often established themselves as post-independent African 
governments).  
 In their edited volume Civil society and the political imagination, anthropologists 
John and Jean Comaroff (1999) also deem it necessary to move away from the Eurocentric 
tendency to limit civil society to a narrowly defined institutional arena. They advocate for the 
acknowledgement of African forms of association, often perceived as ‘uncool’, ‘partisan’, 
‘parochial’ or ‘fundamentalist’ in donor policy discourses. Instead of asking what the idea of 
civil society can tell us about contemporary Africa, they propose to ask what a specific set of 
African cases can “tell us about the planetary appeal of the Idea of civil society” (Comaroff 
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and Comaroff 1999: 3). Given the historical roots of the concept of civil society in European 
eighteenth century thinking, the Comaroffs ask: what were the circumstances under which the 
idea of civil society gained prominence in the European context, and what could civil society 
mean in the African context? Like Mamdani, they propose to look at ‘actually existing civil 
society’ instead of transposing a prescriptive concept of civil society onto the continent. 
 Similarly, Wachira Maina (1998: 137) has argued for the need to open up the concept 
of civil society in order to reveal the broader spectrum of associational life: 
 
A shift in perspective from a preoccupation with organizations and institutions to an activity 
view of civil society. Those who focus on organizational forms and institutions do great 
injustice to civil society in Africa. Much that is both interesting and transformative in the 
continent occurs outside or at the periphery of formal organizational life. Spontaneous 
protests, laxity and lack of discipline and active non-cooperation with the State are important 
civil activities […]. Spontaneous, non-confrontational methods […] are safer ways of 
registering one’s disagreement with the government than more robust public activities such 
as protest marches, placard-waving and burning effigies. 
 
By broadening the definition of civil society, issues not captured in conventional theories on 
civil society suddenly become visible. While civil society as policy prescription merely seeks 
to highlight the absence of civil society in Africa in order to justify intervention from 
Western donors who have a vested interest in a weakened state and a stronger civil society 
dependent on donor funds, deployment of the concept of civil society as explanatory concept 
assists in revealing a complex, vibrant, diverse and historicised picture of associational life on 
the African continent. 
 
4. The public sphere in the Habermasian sense 
While the concept of civil society has often been considered as a policy prescription, a similar 
tendency can be discerned in writings on the public sphere in Africa. Of course, both are 
treated as fundamental building blocks of liberal-democratic political theory and considered 
as essential to a well-functioning liberal democracy. The term ‘public sphere’ is mostly 
associated with the German sociologist Jurgen Habermas who used the term in his book The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society which was published in 1962 in German but translated into English in 1989 and has 
since then become very influential. 
 In this book, Habermas argues that the emergence of capitalism in European feudal 
societies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries enabled a new sphere or space for the 
exchange of ideas through rational communication. In the feudal era, public communication 
was always constrained by the power of the two most powerful feudal institutions: the church 
and the state. Both exercised a very considerable degree of control over the circulation of 
ideas and information. However, with the expansion of capitalist markets and production 
relations, a new space emerged between the church and the state which opposed the absolutist 
monarchical regime. Habermas argued that this space “may be conceived as a sphere where 
private people come together as public and discuss matters of common concern” (1989: 27). 
In the public sphere, individuals were expected to put aside their private interests and to 
deliberate about the collective good. Habermas argues that the emergence of such a level of 
collective discussion was unprecedented in history, and was sustained by the emergence of a 
network of theatres, coffee shops, newspapers, journals and debating societies.  
 Habermas considers the public sphere as a normative concept and as a precondition 
for ‘true’ democracy, just like civil society has been considered as a crucial counterweight to 
the state. For Habermas, public deliberation is essential in order to ensure that public policy 
decisions are made in an informed and enlightened manner. He considers the public sphere as 
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a space where public opinion is shaped. Politicians then take their decisions on the basis of 
democratic debates in the public sphere. The function of the public sphere is to mediate 
between civil society and the state and it provides a space for rational debate that ultimately 
will give rise to a consensus on public affairs. Media act as conduits in this regard; they 
constitute a discursive space, a space in which issues of public concern are deliberated. 
Audiences are seen as citizens engaged in public dialogue in and through the media. Media 
are considered as important in carrying information that enables citizens to make informed 
political choices. Having access to information on for example the positions of different 
political parties is taken as “the precondition for political knowledge and action, and the 
creation of citizenship” (Bignell 2000: 155).  
 In his book, Habermas presents the concept of public sphere as a profoundly 
normative concept. For example, he describes a historical transformation from the ‘good’ 
eighteenth century public sphere to a decline in what he considers a ‘worsening’ public 
sphere in the nineteenth century. Habermas argues that in the nineteenth century 
communication and the exchange of ideas increasingly became dependent upon a new group 
of sponsors and patrons and upon new structures of authority which pose an increasing threat 
to the rationality of debate and the universalistic criteria by which arguments should be 
evaluated. For Habermas, the capitalist system gradually coming into place in the nineteenth 
century replaces monarchs, church and feudal lords with advertising, public relations and 
commercial sponsorship of mass communication. In this transformation, the distinction 
between rational communication and the public representation of private interests 
increasingly becomes blurred. As capitalism progressively re-feudalises the public sphere, the 
selection and representation of information placed in the public domain is undertaken 
according to commercial or political interests rather than based on ‘pure’ reason and 
rationality. In this regard, the demise of public service broadcasting and the 
commercialisation and tabloidisation of media is often brought up as an example of the 
declining public sphere and the ‘dumbing down’ of public debate.  
 Habermases’ account of the public sphere has been criticised for a number of reasons 
by media scholars and political scientists. First of all, critics have argued that the 
Habermasian public sphere was essentially a bourgeois space and was not as easily accessible 
as was implied in his book. For example, Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge (1972) have 
argued that the public sphere is not the exclusive property of the bourgeoisie but they 
distinguish elite and proletarian public spheres which exist simultaneously along class lines. 
Both spheres are formed by different and often competing constituencies and are not usually 
recognised as legitimate public spheres. As examples, they include phenomena such as labour 
strikes and football matches which operate outside the usual parameters of institutional 
legitimation, and constitute different arenas of self-expression by groups excluded from 
formal arenas of public discourse. Similarly, Todd Gitlin (1998) highlights a trend towards a 
segmented public sphere split into public sphericules which further undermines Habermases’ 
idea of a unitary public sphere. Nancy Fraser (1992) also argues against the desirability of a 
unitary public sphere as normative ideal. She accuses Habermas of idealising his liberal 
public sphere and of failing to examine non-liberal, non-bourgeois and competing public 
spheres. Fraser particularly highlights the way in which women were excluded from 
Habermases’ liberal public sphere.  
 Another point of contention in Habermases’ theory is his focus on rational-critical 
debate which arguably is based on an elitist conception of liberal democracy that precludes a 
more radical conceptualisation of democracy as dissensus and conflict (Mouffe 2000). 
Habermases’ understanding of democracy merely favours an elite minority and has not 
resulted into a true ‘democratisation’ of power relations. For example, Laclau and Mouffe 
have argued that “the problem with ‘actually existing’ liberal democracies is not with their 
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constitutive values crystallized in the principles of liberty and equality for all, but with the 
system of power which redefines and limits the operation of those values. This is why our 
project of ‘radical and plural democracy’ was conceived as a new stage in the deepening of 
the ‘democratic revolution’, as the extension of the democratic struggles for equality and 
liberty to a wider range of social relations” (1985: xv). These scholars thus advocate for a 
more substantive definition of democracy which goes beyond merely the regular conduct of 
free and fair elections, a multi-party system and respect for human rights. Scholars such as 
Dahlberg and Siapera (2007) have used Laclau and Mouffe’s normative concept of ‘radical 
democracy’ to assess the democratising potential of the Internet.  
 Habermases’ idea of rational debate as a power-free zone should thus be understood 
as a profoundly ideological construct. It presumes that particularly those with access to 
education and those with property can participate in a rational debate, hereby excluding those 
without education and property. In his account of the public sphere, Habermas assumes the 
possibility of a consensual world in which there is a shared, mutual understanding of the 
conventions of debate and a shared interest in the outcome of political and moral debates. The 
Habermasian public sphere is characterised by rational communication that is undistorted by 
interests or power structures. This is in strong contrast to, for example, Foucault who 
questioned whether it even makes sense to speak of the possibility of ‘rational 
communication’, given that power relations permeate all of human relations. Foucault would 
firmly reject the possibility of a power-free zone of communication. Habermas does not deal 
with the exclusion that is involved in the designation of a particular form of communication 
as the rational and democratically legitimate norm. 
 Foucault would be more interested in investigating under what conditions knowledge 
is considered as true and under what conditions a public sphere is considered to be rational. 
For him, truth is something that is contingent and constantly changing while Habermas 
retains a firm belief in the Enlightenment project, in a single truth which he would define as 
the outcome of rational public deliberations. For Foucault, rationality and power are not two 
opposing categories, in the sense that one situation is characterised by power and the next 
step is to move towards consensus and rationality. Foucault does not deem it possible to 
conceive of a public sphere as a space which is free from power relations under the right 
circumstances. However, for Habermas, the absence of market pressures under capitalism - 
which according to him resulted in the decline of the public sphere in the nineteenth century - 
could lead to a ‘better’ public sphere. Foucault, on the other hand, considers power relations 
to be always prevalent and he prefers to see the public sphere as a site of political struggle 
and conflict rather than as a consensual space.  
 Like the concept of civil society, the Habermasian notion of ‘public sphere’ should 
thus be understood as primarily a normative concept. Although many African(ist) scholars 
have critiqued the concept of civil society, the concept of public sphere has predominantly 
been criticized from the fields of media studies and political science. Points of contention 
have been: the bourgeois character of the Habermasian public sphere, his assumption of a 
unitary public sphere and Habermases’ neglect of power relations within the public sphere.  
 
5. The debate on the public sphere in African studies 
While there has been a vigorous debate on the notion of civil society in African studies and a 
lively exchange on the public sphere in media studies and political science, there has been 
less explicit theorising on the concept of the public sphere in African Studies. Peter Ekeh’s 
seminal 1975 article entitled Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: a theoretical 
statement probably springs to mind most immediately. In this article, Ekeh (1975: 111) 
argues that the Western experience of a unified public sphere, which the state and civil 
society both occupy, is not reflective of African social spaces: 
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[I]f we are to capture the spirit of African politics we must seek what is unique in them. I am 
persuaded that the colonial experience provides that uniqueness. Our post-colonial present 
has been fashioned by our colonial past. It is that colonial past that has defined for us the 
spheres of morality that have come to dominate our politics.  
 
Crucial to this colonial inheritance is Ekeh’s distinction between two publics: the primordial 
and the civic public. Ekeh argues that the post-colonial African state has not been successful 
in its hegemonic drive, so that the political space it occupies is by no means the only public 
space that exists in Africa. For Ekeh, the sphere of what he calls the primordial public 
“occupies vast tracts of the political spaces that are relevant for the welfare of the individual, 
sometimes limiting and breaching the state’s efforts to extend its claims beyond the civic 
public sphere” (1975: 107). Ethnicity offers a shared identity in Ekeh’s primordial public. He 
provides voluntary ethnic-based associations as example of primordial publics.  
 However, even though Ekeh uses the term ‘public’, one could argue it actually refers 
to the notion of civil society. Subsequent scholars have also primarily adopted Ekeh’s 
concept in this way. For example, Eghosa Osaghae (2006) has used Ekeh’s ideas to argue that 
Western scholars in their conceptualisation of civil society have only focused on those 
organisations that had the capacity to challenge the state, and hereby they have excluded 
‘rural and kinship, ethnic associations’ from their analysis, which for Ekeh would belong to 
the ‘primordial public’. In this way, as Osaghae argues, they have made it appear that Africa 
does not have a civil society. Because of their particular definition of civil society, they have 
not fully appreciated associational life in Africa. 
 As Calhoun (1993) has argued, it is common for scholars to use the concepts of civil 
society and public sphere interchangeably. However, as he outlines, the concepts have very 
different connotations. For Calhoun, the public sphere refers to a discursive space of public 
deliberation whereas civil society implies some form of political organisation. Furthermore, 
civil society is defined by virtue of being a realm outside the state (often in opposition to the 
state although this has been fiercely contested in African Studies). The notion of the public 
sphere, on the other hand, is defined in opposition to a private sphere, i.e. the domain of the 
home or the space where private interests dominate. Hence, the public sphere partly overlaps 
with the state and civil society; it is a sphere where both the state and civil society articulate 
their interests.  
 While Ekeh’s work may not explicitly engage with the definition of public sphere as 
an arena of public debate, his acknowledgement of the bifurcated nature of publics in Africa 
is useful. As stated above, Fraser, Gitlin and Negt & Kluge have all criticised the unitary 
nature of the Habermasian public sphere. Ekeh similarly argues that colonialism resulted into 
two fundamentally separate publics: the primordial and civil public. If we for example look at 
the way in which media in Africa constituted publics during colonialism, these could be 
referred to as civic publics which mainly targeted settler audiences. Africans were 
fundamentally excluded from these publics, and hence forced to establish their own spaces in 
what Ekeh refers to as the primordial public. A focus on a unitary public sphere such as 
Habermas recommends then prevents us from appreciating alternative publics that emerged, 
for instance, both during Rhodesia’s settler regime and in post-independent Zimbabwe. It is 
therefore more useful to speak of publics in the plural sense than to construct a single public 
as it will bring to light the different publics which contest each other. 
 Apart from Ekeh’s work, scholars working on popular culture have also – albeit 
implicitly - addressed the issue of publics in Africa (Ellis 1989; James and Kaarsholm 2000; 
Schulz 1999, 2002; Spitulnik 2002). An advantage of conceptualising sites of popular culture 
as publics is that it avoids Habermases’ elitist connotation of his concept of the public sphere. 
Popular culture often engages, interacts and responds to official debates. The concept is 
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frequently defined in terms of its oppositionality to power, as is apparent from Stuart Hall’s 
definition: “The people versus the power-bloc: this, rather than ‘class-against-class’, is the 
central line of contradiction around which the terrain of culture is polarised. Popular culture, 
especially, is organised around this contradiction: the popular forces versus the power-bloc” 
(1981: 238). Hall derives his definition from Antonio Gramsci who considers popular culture 
as the arena where hegemony is contested.  
 In this regard, popular culture can be seen as a public space where ordinary Africans 
are able to debate issues and bring up matters of concern. Karen Barber (1987: 2) has argued 
that the most important attribute of popular culture in Africa is its power to communicate 
because “for the majority of Africans, the arts are the only channel of public communication 
at their disposal”. And as Barber (1987: 3) points out, this is especially so in a climate where 
the ruling elite dominate public space:  
 
In Africa ordinary people tend to be invisible and inaudible. In most African states, 
numerically tiny elites not only consume a vastly disproportionate share of the national 
wealth, they also take up all the light. Newspapers, radio and television offer a magnified 
image of the class that controls them. Not only does the ruling elite make the news, it is the 
news – as endless verbatim reports of politicians’ speeches, accounts of elite weddings and 
birthday parties, and the pages and pages of expensive obituaries testify. 
 
Hence, the importance of songs, jokes and drama as important channels of communication 
for people who are not being granted access to official media. Barber sees popular culture as 
a space that is dominated by “a pervasive sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’, even though the 
boundaries between these categories may be highly porous and shifting” (1997: 4). However, 
this is not to suggest that popular culture is necessarily class-based. It is not per se related to a 
particular stratum of society. Barber considers the ‘popular’ more as a field of exploration 
rather than as a stable identity. Popular culture is defined in its opposition to ‘them’, often 
political elites.  
 A central problem with studies of popular culture, however, is that these sometimes 
end up naively celebrating agency. As Lila Abu-Lughod has argued, they begin to read “all 
forms of resistance as signs of the ineffectiveness of systems of power and of the resilience 
and creativity of the human spirit in its refusal to be dominated” (1990: 41). But, as she 
argues, “[b]y reading resistance in this way, we collapse distinctions between forms of 
resistance and foreclose certain questions about the workings of power” (Abu-Lughod 1990: 
42). In many ways, the study of popular culture and resistance should be seen as a response to 
the privileging of elite culture as worthy of studying and the ignorance of working class 
culture. Also, it was a response to Marxism which considered popular culture as escapist and 
as a repository of false consciousness. Cultural studies opposed these ideas and argued that 
popular culture was something worth studying and could even form the basis for social 
change. But to some extent, this point has now been made: the study of popular culture has 
been placed firmly on the agenda and cultural studies has almost become institutionalised as 
Johannes Fabian (1998: 139) points out in his book on popular culture in Africa: 
 
As I look back on this project […] I conclude it is, or should be, both. It is a manifesto in that the 
conclusion can only be a plea for more attention to and better understanding of elements that, so 
far, seem to have been revealed mainly with the help of the concept of popular culture. It is an 
epitaph in that popular culture studies in Africa should probably be thought of as belonging to those 
self-liquidating disciplines, the need for which disappears to the extent that they are successful in 
accomplishing their work. 
 
Similarly, Mbembe is concerned about what he calls “the rediscovery of the subaltern subject 
and the stress of his/her inventiveness” which has “taken the form of an endless invocation of 
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the notions of ‘hegemony’, ‘moral economy’, ‘agency’ and ‘resistance’” (2001: 5). Mbembe 
has also been critical of the hydraulic models of domination and resistance that have long 
dominated historiographies within African Studies. Instead, he proposes a deconstruction of 
these oppositional models and draws attention to ‘popular’ rituals of power and subordination 
that seem to simultaneously ridicule and reinstate state power. Unlike Bakhtin’s notion of 
carnival as a ‘popular’ site of the inversion of hierarchies through ridicule and parody, 
Mbembe’s postcolonial subject enthusiastically participates in state power through its rituals 
of ratification. As an example, Mbembe mentions how during a political rally, Togolese 
poached the meaning of the party acronym RPT making it synonymous not with 
Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT) but subverting the acronym’s meaning to “the 
sound of a fart emitted by quivering buttocks which can only smell disgusting” (2001: 6). So 
Mbembe argues that the relationship between those who rule and those who are ruled “is not 
primarily a relationship of resistance or of collaboration but can best be characterised as 
convivial” (Mbembe 2001: 104). This relationship then robs both the dominant and those 
dominated of their agency and makes them both impotent. Mbembe speaks of an ‘intimacy of 
tyranny’ which according to him inscribes “the dominant and the dominated within the same 
episteme” (2001: 110, 128). 
 While Mbembe does not explicitly claim to build up his theoretical framework around 
concepts of ‘public sphere’ and ‘popular culture’, both implicitly play an important role in his 
account of the postcolony. In his book, Mbembe shows how the rulers make attempts to 
claim public spaces through their extravagant state ceremonies which display the grandiosity 
of their power but at the same time, he demonstrates how the ruled manage to carve out a 
space for themselves, therefore constituting their own alternative popular publics next to 
official publics. Mbembe’s work is also important because it does not uncritically celebrate 
agency but provides a more complex and nuanced account of power. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this article, I have highlighted the problems and opportunities that the concepts of civil 
society, public sphere and popular culture offer when used in African Studies. First of all, the 
concept of civil society as policy prescription and Habermases’ concept of the public sphere 
should both be seen as highly normative and idealised notions which have often been used to 
demonstrate Africa’s lack, i.e. the absence of a civil society or the presence of an inadequate 
public sphere tightly controlled by government. These notions have therefore not always 
contributed towards a richer and fuller understanding of associational life and publics in 
Africa. Hence, it may be necessary, as Appadurai and Breckenridge (1995) have suggested, 
to determine the meaning of civil society and public sphere in the specific African context 
and to remove these concepts from their European baggage: 
 
[…] to loosen the link between the word public and the history of civil society in Europe, 
and to agree that it be used to refer to a set of arenas that have emerged in a variety of 
historical conditions and that articulate the space between domestic life and the projects of 
the nation-state – where different social groups (classes, ethnic groups, genders) constitute 
their identities by their experience of mass-mediated forms in relation to the practices of 
everyday life. Public in this usage ceases to have any necessary or predetermined 
relationship to formal politics, rational communicative action, print capitalism or the 
dynamics of the emergence of a literate bourgeoisie. Thus the term becomes emancipated 
from any specific Euro-American master narrative and indicates an arena of cultural 
contestation in which modernity can become a diversely appropriated experience.  
 
A major problem with Habermases’ public sphere is its privileging of rational-critical debate 
as a precondition for a ‘good’ public sphere. This assumes that there is somehow a clear 
definition of what this would involve and it presupposes that it is possible to move from a 
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situation characterised by power and conflicting interests to a consensual sphere. In line with 
Foucault, I prefer to see publics as spaces of conflict and contestation. The notion of popular 
culture has been useful in understanding how this process of contestation evolves. However, 
sometimes, accounts of popular cultures have ended up in uncritically celebrating agency and 
resistance. Mbembe, in this regard, has offered a more complex account of power that moves 
away from the dichotomy between domination and resistance which has characterised a lot of 
work in African Studies. While this article merely aimed to offer a preliminary evaluation of 
work on the public sphere in African Studies, it has made an attempt to outline some ways in 
which a more engaged dialogue between political scientists and cultural studies scholars 
could potentially contribute towards a fuller and richer understanding of publics in Africa.  
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